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Keynote Address, ILJ 2009 Symposium
February 27, 2009
Kevin Arquitt
Good afternoon. I remember many sessions in this room, all from the
other side of the desk, which, I suggest, is the less enjoyable place to be.
First of all, I would like to thank those of you who organized this sympo-
sium. Law students do not have a whole lot of extra time on their hands,
particularly those who are associated with journals. Time is a very pre-
cious commodity, and yet somehow you found time to organize this very
comprehensive symposium.
I hope that you get as much benefit from the session as we who were
invited here to speak. Many of us speaking today have known each other
for years, but we don't have the opportunity to see each other all that often,
which serves to make this event more special. And I have to say that when
you are associated with as great an institution as Cornell, you certainly
have a lot of advantages in attracting people to campus, but most assur-
edly, geographic location in March is not one of them. So I congratulate
you on the group you have put together and on the size of the audience you
have gathered.
My initial interest in antitrust, and my decision to pursue a career in
that area, is the result of interactions with two people who are in the room
today. George Hay, who I believe was in his first year of teaching at Cornell
Law School, taught me antitrust economics. At that time, Don Baker was
away as Assistant Attorney General, but when he returned to the law
school, I took antitrust courses from him as well. In fact, I think more than
one of the courses were held in this room, so it really is coming back home
for me, and I enjoy it very, very much.
Now, today and tomorrow you will hear a lot about various regulatory
approaches that different national agencies apply to antitrust. Since I do
not want to jump the gun on what other people are going to say, I thought
it might make more sense for me to take the time to back up and talk about
something more foundational. In a general sense, this symposium is about
comparative policies. Probably the two jurisdictions best known for anti-
trust enforcement are the United States and Europe, so I will share my
views as to whether these regimes are moving closer together, which is
t Kevin J. Arquit is a parmer in the law firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP
and head of the firm's Competition Law Practice. Mr. Arquit served as Director of the
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known as convergence,1 or whether they are drifting apart.
To be sure, this general subject is a very well-traveled road. What I
would like to do today is to take a slightly different path. The typical
approach of United States commentators addressing convergence is, in my
view, very U.S.-centric. The question often posed is whether the European
antitrust model is moving closer to the United States. 2 You never hear the
question asked: "Is the United States moving closer to Europe?"-Ameri-
cans just do not think of the issue in that way.
Of course, the unspoken assumption in asking the question in the
conventional way is that the better approach is for Europe to move closer to
the U.S. model.3 And indeed, U.S. government officials have been known
to fly on unsolicited trips to foreign capitals when the European Commis-
sion has taken action that is not to their liking. U.S. officials have criti-
cized Commission decisions in press conferences, suggesting, in effect,
that once Europe gets it right it will adopt the U.S. approach.
Now, in the most general terms, I would like to give you a flavor of the
conventional wisdom regarding the different approaches to antitrust. In
the United States, merger policy has followed a consistent approach since
1984, when formal guidelines were implemented. 4 Those guidelines, insti-
tuted more than twenty-five years ago, are reflective of a fairly stable pol-
icy;5 they are very flexible, and they allow for changes around the margins.
The 1984 guidelines reflect a theoretic approach, known as the "Chi-
cago School of Economics."6 The essential premise of the Chicago School
is that we do not know an awful lot about how humans actually behave,
but we know, basically, how the rational person thinks.7 And so the doc-
trine is based on a theory of rational choice. The approach of the merger
guidelines, and the Chicago School, accepts as a premise that individuals
and firms will make rational choices.8 And by rational choices, what they
mean is that firms, armed with adequate information, will make decisions
1. See Randolph W. Tritell, International Antitrust Convergence: A Positive View,
2005 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 25, 25 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Todd R. Overton, Substantive Distinctions Between United States Anti-
trust Law and the Competition Policy of the European Community: A Comparative Analysis
of Divergent Policies, 13 Hous. J. lr'L L. 315, 320-22 (1991).
3. See id. at 341 ("The surest method to create such stability is to reach an under-
standing between the American government and the EC Commission to ensure that the
burgeoning EC laws develop in a direction that makes them compatible with those of the
United States.").
4. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,
103 (June 14, 1984).
5. See Synopsys Inc./Avant! Corporation, FTC File No. 021-0049, Statement of
Commissioner Thomas B. Leary (July 26. 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2002/07/avantlearystmnt.htm ("1984 Merger Guidelines ... are still authoritative").
6. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 937, 947
n.43 (1984) ("The 1984 Merger Guidelines are a product of the new economic orienta-
tion in antitrust law, if not an outright product of Chicago School economic theories.").
7. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 925, 928 (1979).
8. Id. at 930.
Vol. 43
2010 Keynote Address, ILJ 2009 Symposium
based on their informed self-interest. 9
In other words, firms will make profit-maximizing decisions. 10 This is
essentially the underpinning of both U.S. merger guidelines and the
entirety of U.S. merger analysis. 1 What flows from this is the notion that
competition 1 2 and free markets provide the best products, the cheapest
products, the highest quality products, and the most choice. 13 There is a
corollary to this, that while markets may temporarily suffer from distor-
tions, they will quickly self-correct. 1 4 There are those who would charac-
terize this as representing a minimalist school of thought.
By extension, government intervention is something that should come
about rarely, and, when it does occur, it should be minimal.1 5 And I think
that, even as of a year ago, the majority of commentators would have gener-
ally agreed that the United States had gotten it right when it comes to how
mergers are analyzed. Judge Richard Posner noted that the intellectual
journey for how we view mergers has basically come to an end and that the
merger guidelines offer a modest vindication of the Chicago School.
16 All
this could lead one to conclude that the U.S. approach is one essentially on
cruise control, on settled presumptions to bring about the best results.
Without going into great depth, historically, the European approach to
antitrust has had different underpinnings.' 7 At a very basic level, there has
been less confidence in Europe that markets always get it right.18 There is
more of a feeling that the government should step in, at least occasionally,
and that it is independently important to maintain certain market
structures. 19
In the United States, if you are really a believer in competition, you
could end up with a market populated by just one firm if its efficiency
causes all other firms to leave the market. If somebody actually wins the
race of competition because they have the better, cheaper product,
wouldn't it be a perverse policy to then turn around and penalize them for
being the winner? So competition in the United States is focused on creat-
ing an environment where parties can start out on an equal playing field,
9. Id. at 928.
10. Id.
11. See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger
Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580, 1583 (1983).
12. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 257, 266 (2001).
13. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 11, at 1584.
14. See Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust, supra note 12, at 266.
15. See Posner, supra note 7, at 948 n.67.
16. RicHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 132 (2d ed. 2001) ("For the time being, the
history of merger doctrine is at an end.").
17. See Overton, supra note 2, at 316-17.
18. See id. at 328.
19. See Derek Ridyard, The Commission's New Horizontal Merger Guidelines: An Eco-
nomic Commentary 12-13 (Global Competition Law Centre, GCLC Working Paper 02/
05 2005), available at http://www.coleurope.eu/content/gclc/documents/GCLC%20
WP%2002-05.pdf.
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but then let happen what may.20 It is not about fairness. 2 1
And I believe that in Europe -and you will hear from European practi-
tioners who will undoubtedly correct me if I am wrong-the approach has
been more to assure that a certain number of players exist in the market.22
At least at the margins, this can result in different policies between the two
jurisdictions.
The Europeans have responded in several ways to the difference in
approach. Some have said that our policies are too Darwinian. 23 Others
refer to U.S. antitrust policy as cowboy capitalism. 24 And the list of pejora-
tives goes on. But nonetheless, through a series of steps over the last ten to
fifteen years, it is fair to say that European merger policy has, in fact,
moved closer to U.S. merger policy.2 5 The European Commission now,
and has actually for several years, had a set of merger guidelines. 26 Their
test is one that focuses on impediments to effective competition as opposed
to just pure dominance. 2 7 They recognize efficiency. 28 These are all steps
suggesting increased convergence with the U.S. approach.
The issuance of guidelines in Europe has led no less than the former
commissioner of the European Commission, Mario Monti, to say, essen-
tially, that the European Commission model has increased its reliance on
solid economic analysis and that it draws upon the American approach.2 9
Thus, at the end of the day, we've observed convergence between the two
regimes over the past several years, but with Europe proceeding at a differ-
ent pace from the United States. There remain differences, but we have
been moving in the same direction.
We can debate whether the changes in Europe are the result of regula-
tors seeing the light and the brilliance of American ideas or whether it is
really the response to a series of stinging defeats that the Commission suf-
fered before the European courts, after blocking some transactions a few
20. See Nicola Giocoli, Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust Law,
the Freiburg School, and the Early Years of European Competition Policy, 5 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 747, 756 (2009).
21. See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the
Euopean Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 981,
983 (1986).
22. See Overton, supra note 2, at 319 (quoting Fox, supra note 21, at 983).
23. See, e.g.,Jay Dratler, Jr., Microsoft as an Antitrust Target: IBM in Software?, 25 Sw.
U.L. REv. 671, 683 (1996) ("Just as the Darwinian process of natural selection does not
care if individual creatures survive, so long as species grow and evolve, so antitrust law
does not care whether individual firms survive, as long as competition itself thrives and
prospers.").
24. See, e.g., J. Bruce McDonald, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Section 2 and Article 82: Cow-
boys and Gentlemen, Remarks before the Global Competition Law Centre Second Annual
Conference 2 (June 16, 2005) (describing the competition-based U.S. antitrust system as
"cowboy capitalism").
25. See Tritell, supra note 1, at 1.
26. See generally Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 24) 1 (EC).
27. See id. art. 2.
28. See id.
29. See Mario Monti, Eur. Comm'r for Competition Pol'y, Competition for Consum-
ers' Benefit, Address at European Competition Day 5-6 (Oct. 22, 2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2004016_en.pdf.
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years ago. My own view is that the latter served as the predominant cause.
Regardless, for the remainder of my time today, I will not discuss the pace
of European change or where it stands; there are others who will discuss
that. I will address some startling changes that recently have taken place in
U.S. merger policy.
Indeed, I suggest, that wherever the European regulators are standing
on the mountain of the Chicago School, if they look up ahead of them, they
are likely to see the U.S. regulators coming back toward them. And, it is
not as though the U.S. regulators are walking back toward them; they are
running back at them. Perhaps more surprising, a lot of these develop-
ments preceded the change in administration and have nothing to do with
the election of President Obama.
And I think that European practitioners may listen with a sense of
irony as they hear a tonal quality coming from U.S. regulators that is very
similar to statements regarding European policy that the United States'
enforcement leadership was so critical of not that long ago.
In the United States, the regulatory question of whether a horizontal
merger is allowed to proceed is purely an economic question.30 It is a deci-
sion based on pure economics: will the merged firm, either by itself or
through some type of tacit coordination with other firms in the industry,
be able to raise prices above a competitive level?3 1 It is an analysis that is
designed solely to look at whether or not the merger creates or enhances
market power, which is the ability to raise prices above a competitive
level. 32
It assumes that firms will act rationally. 3 3 It assumes that they are
informed and that their preferences are stable, which means that they
would make the same decision on day two that they made on day one as
long as nothing has changed in the interim. The decision of a firm is based
on profit maximization, which, again, is very much of an economic con-
cept. 34 Because of the purely economic basis underpinning U.S. regulatory
review, the issue of national champions does not arise-you do not arbi-
trarily pick one company and say, "We're going to pick this one to be the
winner."3 5
Similarly, enforcers resist calls, which come from political corners all
the time, to engage in merger analysis in a way that, for example, protects
small business or protects a certain level of jobs in a particular commu-
nity.36 Those are all great public policy goals, but they have nothing to do
with economic efficiency. U.S. policies are accused of being Darwinian,
30. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 0.2 (1992).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Posner, supra note 7, at 928.
34. Id.
35. See Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, FTC, Remarks at the Int'l Competition
Conference/EU Competition Day: National Champions: I Don't Even Think it Sounds
Good 4 (Mar. 26, 2007).
36. See id. at 6; see also Overton, supra note 2, at 317.
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and in many ways they are.3 7 But that is what it means to have a policy
that protects competition, not competitors.3 8 In a regime where the protec-
tion of competition is the overriding objective, those who don't measure up
fail, and those associated with those who don't measure up fail.
This policy inevitably allows mergers that can result in people getting
laid off. Plants will be closed. But U.S. merger policy, at least for the last
two decades, has been focused solely on economic efficiency. 39 In fact,
merging companies sometimes rely on anticipated efficiencies as a reason
for allowing a merger, arguing that a combination will eliminate redun-
dancy. In other words, it will eliminate jobs that are no longer needed
because they can be done by one person in the combined entity.
To be sure, the situation can result in dislocations, but the Chicago
School does not really trouble itself with that because of a belief the ends
justify the means: "Yes, those are bad, but at the end of the day, this is
what's best for the most people. This is how we maximize consumer wel-
fare."'40 The Chicago School believes that the firm that delivers a product
on the cheapest basis available will win the race of competition, and that is
the basis on which the economy should operate. 4 1 Dislocations exist, but
they are unavoidable.
Any other policy, designed to protect some element of inefficiency,
would create still other inefficiencies that would harm a greater number of
people. That is really the sum and substance of the pure Chicago
approach. In contrast, under the European model, the focus has been: if we
really want an industry to operate competitively, we have to have a certain
number of firms operating within it. 4 2 In response, it is argued: it is all
well and good to encourage competition, but then if you have a winner, let
them be the winner.4 3
I would note that the objectives of the European law are somewhat
different from ours. European antitrust law is meant to facilitate integra-
tion into the common market. 44 This has led some U.S. critics to say, and I
think largely these are unfounded criticisms, that the Europeans are fond
of picking national champions.4 5 The argument is that the Europeans
37. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 118
(Basic Books, Inc., 1978); Dratler, supra note 23.
38. See Overton, supra note 2, at 318.
39. See BoRK, supra note 37, at 91; see also Posner, supra note 7, at 931-32; J.
Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, FTC, Int'l Bar Ass'n Antitrust Section Conference: I Say
Monopoly, You Say Dominance: The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant
Firms, Is It the Economics? 5-7 (Sept. 8, 2007).
40. See Bomr, supra note 37, at 66, 91; Rosch, supra note 39, at 16 ("Chicago School
adherents generally think of 'consumer welfare' far more broadly, believing the antitrust
laws should be applied in a way that maximizes society's wealth as a whole.").
41. See generally Posner, supra note 7.
42. See VALENTINE KoRAM, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE 315 (Hart Publishing, 9th ed., 2007).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 317.
45. See James F. Rill et al., The New European Antitrust Regime: Implications for Mul-
tinationals, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 269, 275-76 (2004).
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select winners as a means of protecting the common market, and that spe-
cific firms are selected and provided breaks that allow them to have a leg
up when it comes to competing with the rest of the world.4 6 In short, crit-
ics claim that the European system tends to protect competitors more than
competition, 4 7 whereas, under the U.S. regime, if you protect competition,
you let the winners and losers fall where they may. 4 8
Now, these differences, for the most part, do not really impact very
many transactions because this is kind of nuance stuff. But, when it does
lead to different results, the fur flies. There have been a couple of circum-
stances over the past few years where identical transactions in the United
States and Europe were looked at by both regimes because they were trans-
actions with world-wide implications. One of these was the Boeing-McDon-
nell Douglas merger. 4 9
The United States took a look at it, and chose not to take any enforce-
ment action, even though Boeing and McDonnell Douglas were two of only
three civilian large aircraft manufacturers.50 The United States' enforcers
reached out and talked to the airlines, only to have the airlines respond
that they did not care about the merger because McDonnell Douglas "can
no longer exert competitive influence in the worldwide market for commer-
cial aircraft."5 1 Note that post-merger, the only remaining player out there
would be Airbus.5 2 Meanwhile, over in Europe, the European Commission
took a different view.
Now, there are cynics who say: "well, maybe the only difference is that
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are American companies and Airbus is a
European company. That led to the different results on different sides of
the ocean."'53 The American point of view was that the European Commis-
sion was not worried about the merger.5 4 The European Commission wor-
ried about making sure that Airbus would be able to survive in the post-
merger world.5 5 Because Boeing had a series of exclusive contracts with
46. See id.
47. See Gabriele Dara, Antitrust Law in the European Community and the United
States: A Comparative Analysis, 47 LA. L. REv. 761, 789-90 (1986).
48. See BORK, supra note 37, at 118-22.
49. See generally Thomas L. Boeder & GaryJ. Dorman, The Boeing/McDonnell Doug-
las Merger: The Economics, Antitrust Law and Politics of the Aerospace Industry, 45 Ar-n-
TRUST BULL. 119 (2000).
50. See id. at 121.
51. Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky et al., In the Matter of The Boeing Co./
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 5 Trade. Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 24,295 (July 1, 1997) (stating
that the Commission interviewed over forty airlines as well as other industry partici-
pants); Kathleen Luz, Note, The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger: Competition Law,
Parochialism, and the Need For a Globalized Antitrust System, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 155, 155-58 (1999).
52. See Boeder & Dorman, supra note 49, at 131-32.
53. Id.
54. See Luz, supra note 51, at 168.
55. See Boeder & Dorman, supra note 49, at 124 ("'[T]he EU [is] most concerned
about Boeing and its role as arch-rival to the European aircraft consortium, Airbus
Industrie.'") (quoting EU Official to Discuss Boeing in Washington, REUTERS FIN. SERV.,
Apr. 16, 1997).
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U.S. airplane manufacturers, the Commission determined that because so
much of the market would be tied up and not available to Airbus, the
merger could only go through if the exclusivity clauses were lifted to give
Airbus the chance to compete for those contracts. 56
In other words, behavioral relief was required by the European Com-
mission as a condition for allowing the deal to go through. There was,
however, some static at the time-non-trivial static-from the United States
that the concerns raised were little more than a device used by the Europe-
ans to favor their own national champion as opposed to making a decision
on the competitive merits.57 While one could infer such motives, I believe
it is also the case that the European Commission decision is reconcilable
with its precedent.58
The transaction that caused a lot more static, which still reverberates
to this day, was the proposed GE-Honeywell combination. General Electric
and Honeywell agreed to merge several years ago. 59 The only identified
overlaps between GE and Honeywell had to do with some fairly minor,
smaller aircraft engines. 60 And those issues were resolved in the United
States pretty quickly. 61 The companies agreed to spin off the overlapping
business to somebody else.62
Yet, over in Europe, the European Commission decided to ban the
transaction outright.63 In other words, they said, "There's no fix here.
You're just not going to do this." What did they base that result on? To
some degree their analysis mirrored the U.S. approach.64 But, in addition
to that, they saw General Electric as a huge financing operation with all
56. See id.
57. See id. at 142.
58. See id. at 142, 144.
59. See Edmund L. Andrews & Paul Meller, Europe Ends Bid by G.E. for Honeywell:
Formal Action Clouds the Future for Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at Cl.
60. David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Competition Thinking at the European Com-
mission: Lessons from the Aborted GE/Honeywell Merger, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 489, 498
(2002) (describing the "little competitive overlap between the two companies" between
GE and Honeywell).
61. See George Stephanov Georgiev, Bridging the Divide? The European Court of First
Instance Judgment in GE/Honeywell, 31 YA.LEJ. INT'L L. 518, 518 (2006) ("The transac-
tion-the largest industrial merger to date-had received speedy approval from the Anti-
trust Division .... "); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Requires
Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter DOJ Press Release (May 2, 2001)], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
press.releases/2001/8140.pdf.
62. DOJ Press Release (May 2, 2001), supra note 61, at 1.
63. Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 Declaring a Concentration to be Incom-
patible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement (Case No. COMP/M.2220-
General Electric/Honeywell) [hereinafter European Commission Decision], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220 en.pdf.
64. See Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of
Merger Control, 23 U. PA. J. lrr'L ECON. L. 457, 463-64 (2002). Compare European
Commission Decision, supra note 63, at 28-30, with DOJ Press Release (May 2, 2001),
supra note 61, at 1 (both the DOJ and EC discussed MROs in the context of the merger)
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kinds of capital. 6 5 Moreover, GE had a subsidiary that was a big purchaser
of airplanes and also a big aircraft engine maker. 66 Honeywell makes avi-
onics-the instruments that go in the airplanes-as well as landing systems
and the like.67
The United States' view was that the whole point of the merger was to
allow for such efficiencies, fully recognizing that, after the merger, the com-
bined entity would very likely be the preferred choice of customers-air-
lines. 68 The fact that customers would be able to go to one source, to
purchase an integrated package that includes engines, airline instruments,
landing systems, and the like was seen as the benefit flowing from the
transaction. 6 9 To the Europeans, the likelihood of this occurrence pro-
vided the very reason to stop the deal. 70 It goes back to the idea about
dictating market structure versus looking solely at the state of competition.
Frankly, I think that the U.S. criticisms of the Europeans were largely
unfounded. Some in the United States had picked up on the public rela-
tions value of saying things that made nice sound bites, but which oversim-
plified the European analysis. Regardless of which enforcer was right or
wrong, it was a common conclusion that as a result of the merger, GE
would be able to offer different mix-and-match packages to its
consumers.
7 1
The concern in Europe was not that these packages would be forced
on consumers-by consumers, I mean the airlines here-but that the air-
lines would actually want the packages. 7 2 That is, the airlines would want
the packages so much that they would no longer have any interest in deal-
ing with the stand-alone companies that had theretofore competed with GE
and Honeywell. 73 The Europeans disapproved of this arrangement
because the GE offer would be so attractive that airlines would move their
65. See European Commission Decision, supra note 63, at 31-35 (describing GE's
capital).
66. See id. at 35-38 (discussing GE Capital Aviation Services (GECAS) and its
purchase of aircraft).
67. See id. at 58-59.
68. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General
Charles A. James on the EU's Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition (July 3,
2001) ("[Tlhe combined firm could offer better products and services at more attractive
prices than either firm could offer individually."), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/pressjreleases/2001/8510.pdf.
69. Id.
70. See European Commission Decision, supra note 63, at 99-102; Georgiev, supra
note 61, at 518-19.
71. European Commission Decision, supra note 63, at 86-88; see Douglas K.
Schnell, Note, All Bundled Up: Bringing the Failed GE/Honeywell Merger in from the Cold,
37 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 217, 240-241 (2004).
72. European Commission Decision, supra note 63, at 106-09 ("[A]s a result of the
proposed merger, it can be expected that customers will continue to have a rather lim-
ited interest in exercising whatever countervailing power they may have vis-a-vis the
merged entity's bundled offers."); see Schnell, supra note 71, at 241.
73. European Commission Decision, supra note 63, at 107 ("As a result, airlines will
have a very limited incentive to exert countervailing buying power since they cannot
really afford to deny themselves short-term benefits even if they are associated with
adverse consequences in the foreseeable future ....").
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business to the combined GE-Honeywell firm. As a result, the stand-alone
companies would not have adequate resources left to engage in research
and development. Ultimately, the other competitors would slowly shrink
into oblivion, with the result that the market would be left with one domi-
nant firm.
7 4
So, the European Commission blocked the deal. 75 The decision was
appealed through the European courts, and several years later, it was
affirmed on certain grounds but not others. 76 But the relevant point for
discussion today is that the deal was blocked, notwithstanding the fact that
the United States had approved it earlier. And, following the EU's rejection,
there was much made of the difference between fairness considerations in
Europe versus the pure efficiency approach of the United States.
Hopefully, this discussion has provided some background on the dif-
ferences between U.S. and European merger review. For the sake of brev-
ity, I have likely over-generalized, but my objective is to make points
strongly enough that you can see cleanly what the distinctions are.
I will now describe my view of where the two regimes have been
headed recently. In Europe, the movement has consistently, if not slowly,
been in the direction of increased emphasis on economic efficiency. 77 I
cannot say the same for the United States, where economic efficiency is
enjoying less prominence at the federal enforcement level.
This is not a statement I would have made until about 2008. Recently,
however, there have been actions taken and statements made by U.S. regu-
lators, most notably at the FTC, that suggest a dramatic turn of direction. I
should note that the Justice Department does not have a new head of the
Antitrust Division yet.7 8 Time will tell what happens there, but in light of
statements made by then-Candidate Obama, it is likely that the Division
will be headed by someone with sharply different views from that of the
last Division head of the Bush Administration. 79
74. Id. at 109 ("[11t can be concluded that the merger will result in the creation/
strengthening of a dominant position on the markets for large commercial aircraft
engines, large regional jet aircraft engines and corporate jet aircraft engines, as well as on
the markets for avionics and non-avionics products.").
75. Id. at 130-31.
76. See, e.g., Case COMP/M. 2220, Commission Decision 2004/134/EC, application
for annulment denied, Case T-210/01 (Ct. of First Instance Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm; Paul Meller, European Court Upholds
Veto of G.E.-Honeywell Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at C7.
77. See Borja Martinez Fernandez, Iraj Hashi & Marc Jegers, The Implementation of
the European Commission's Merger Regulation 2004: An Empirical Analysis, 4 J. CoMP. L.
& EcON. 791, 793 (2008) (characterizing Europe's shift in merger tests as "aligning the
regulations with U.S. standards").
78. Subsequently, Christine Varney was confirmed as the head of the Justice Depart-
ment Antitrust Division. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Eric
Holder Welcomes Assistant Attorneys General for Antitrust, Civil, and Criminal Divi-
sions, (April 20, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/
2009/245029.pdf.
79. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 191, 194-95, 194
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Note the difference in procedure with the FTC, where the commission-
ers sit for fixed terms of seven years and the lineup does not necessarily
change much with a change in administration.80 The chairman changes
because there can only be three commissioners from one party,8 ' and the
incoming president always names one of the sitting commissioners from
his or her party to be the chair.8 2
If you think my contention that the United States is moving away from
economic efficiency is an overstatement, I would start out by pointing you
to a statement made not by one of the Democratic FTC commissioners, but
by a Republican commissioner appointed during a Republican administra-
tion.8 3 Within the last month, after observing that two of his heroes-pure
Chicago School types, Henry Paulson and Alan Greenspan-had bolted
and discarded the Chicago School,84 he followed suit. I'll read you what he
said, "One thing is clear to me: the orthodox and unvarnished Chicago
School of economic thought is on life support, if it is not dead."8 5
He went on to say that the change in policy had been so rapid that the
FTC website had not even had time to catch up.8 6 Commissioner Rosch
was referring to several quotes on the FTC website, touting that the FTC
has "faith in the market."8 7 For anyone who follows these agencies at all,
the idea that a commissioner-any commissioner, let alone a Republican
commissioner-is apologizing about what is on the FTC website because it
references faith in the markets is unusual, to say the least. To be clear, the
Chicago School has been the underpinning of antitrust analysis in this
country for the last twenty-five years. 8
Chairman Rosch went on to say that "some would even say that [the]
Chicago School is 'out' and Keynesian economics is 'in.'"8 9 Now, I have
already discussed what the Chicago School stands for. In contrast, Keyne-
sian economics concerns itself with identifying situations when govern-
ment should intervene with spending to stimulate the economy. 90
n.9 (2008) (discussing the adherence by Bush administration antitrust officials, includ-
ing Thomas Barnett, to the ideas of the Chicago School).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
81. Id.
82. Id. ("The President shall choose a chairman from the Commission's
membership.").
83. 151 CONG. REC. S13969 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2005).
84. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the New York Bar
Association Annual Dinner 4-5 (Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Speech by J. Thomas
Roschl, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090129financialcrisisnybar-
speech.pdf.
85. Id. at 2.
86. See id. at 3.
87. See id; Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition, http://www.ftc.gov/
bc/index.shtml.
88. See TONY A. FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 1930-2004 6 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2006) (discussing the shift to the dominance of the Chicago School
starting in the 1970s and continuing into the new century).
89. Speech by J. Thomas Rosch, supra note 84, at 4.
90. See Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN. ST. L.
REv. 417, 434 (2008).
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According to John Maynard Keynes, there are appropriate times for the gov-
ernment to spend and such spending is what fixes markets that are not
always self-correcting (or at least not quickly self-correcting). 9 1 These
statements are certainly a far cry from the Posner quote I gave you, made
not that long ago, where he declared the intellectual journey for merger
review had reached an end, that the key ideological battles had been fought
and won, and that there is now universal consensus on how enforcers
should proceed.
Now, some of you might be thinking that I am, just to be controversial
and provocative, picking out one speech and taking a couple of sentences
out of context. After all, anybody, even commissioners, will sometimes
stray and say things in order to get the discussion going. That is fair
enough, so let me give you a couple further examples in support of my
position.
I should note first that I am really trying to avoid the macro-political
scene, that is, the results that will occur strictly because of the election. To
be sure, people are running all over Washington to distance themselves
from the policies of the last eight years simply because of the economic
situation we are in right now. Whether those policies were right or wrong,
or a cause or non-cause of where we are, no one is going to embrace them.
Realistically, that is just Washington.
You observe officials like Mary Shapiro, the new head of the SEC, say
that her primary initial goal is to reverse the market-driven policies of her
predecessor. 9 2 So, this is not something that is limited to the FTC. But, as
noted, I am not really talking about that aspect of change. I am talking
about changes that I believe started to occur before the groundswell occa-
sioned by the recent election.
Going back to the FTC for a minute, there was a paper submitted
recently by the American Antitrust Institute (AA). 9 3 In a rare moment of
prudence before I criticized the paper, I looked to see who was on the advi-
sory board and saw it included Professor Hay. But, as he quickly reminds
me, just because you are on the board does not mean you approve of any
particular paper. The reason I point this out is simply to substantiate that
this is a legitimate, mainstream operation. The AAI is not the left wing's
response to the Cato Institute.
In any event, a merger recently was proposed between Pfizer and
91. See id.
92. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief Pursues Reversal of Years of Lax Enforcement,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at B1 ("Less than a month after becoming the head of the
[SEC], Mary L. Shapiro is moving swiftly to reverse major decisions by her
predecessor...").
93. See Letter from Albert A. Foer, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., to Eric Holder et
al., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Foer Letter], availa-
ble at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/Pfizer-Wyeth%20AAI%20memo.
2.11.09_021420090933.pdf; Memorandum from William S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer,
Am. Antitrust Ins., to the Attorney Gen. and U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n 1 (Feb. 11, 2009)
[hereinafter Memorandum from AA], available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
archives/files/Pfizer-Wyeth%20AAI%20memo.2.11.09_021420090933.pdf.
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Wyeth. 9 4 As a disclaimer, I should note that my firm represents Wyeth,
but my comments are not relevant to that representation. AAI submitted a
paper, touting that it had been written by two former heads of the FTC
Bureau of Economics. 95 One of them was the head when I was in high
school-trust me that was long time ago. And the more recent of them was
at the FTC 30 years ago. 9 6 I think it takes a bit of base stealing to imply
that these are recent policy makers.
Essentially, Wyeth/Pfizer is, from an antitrust standpoint, a standard
pharmaceutical merger.9 7 Each of these companies makes a lot of prod-
ucts.98 There are some areas where there is a therapeutic overlap, and the
government is presumably going to look at those, make decisions about
what the competition looks like before and after the merger, and determine
whether any relief is required as a condition to being allowed to close the
deal. 99 But the AAI authors, Professors Comanor and Scherer, believe this
thinking is way too small; instead, they unabashedly advocate a mode of
analysis, which they themselves characterize as beyond the conventional
scope under the antitrust laws.100
So why would they have the FTC block this merger? First of all, they
object on macroeconomic theory grounds. 10 1 They are also concerned
that some TARP money was used to finance this transaction and that the
companies are relying on banks for financing. 10 2 That happens in any big
merger. So, what is the issue with the banks using TARP money? The
paper argues the following, in sequence: that the funds will end up in the
hands of the shareholders; 10 3 everybody knows that shareholders are
wealthy people; wealthy people do not spend money, they save money.
This means that TARP money is going to go into wealthy people's saving
accounts instead of being used for job-expansion opportunities. 10 4 They
argue that this provides a reason to block the merger. 10 5 The authors refer-
ence conventional analysis as well but only to buttress their other reason-
94. See Matt Herper, Will Pfizer's Merger Hurt Innovation?, FORBES, Jan. 26, 2009.
95. See Foer Letter, supra note 93.
96. See UCLA Faculty: William S. Comanor Biography, http://www.ph.ucla.edu/hs/
bio comanor.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
97. Cf. Patricia M. Danzon et al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and
Biotech Industries 7 (University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Working Paper,
Sept. 2003), available at http://hc.wharton.upenn.edu/nicholson/pdf/merger_- Sept03.
pdf (finding that all but three of the top pharmaceutical companies in the United States
have been involved in "major horizontal acquisitions" in the past fifteen years).
98. See All Products, http://www.wyeth.com/products; Pfizer Pharmaceutical Prod-
ucts, http://www.pfizer.com/products/rx/prescription.jsp.
99. See Thomas B. Marcotullio, The Battle Against Drug-Makers: An Analysis of Euro-
pean Union and United States Merger Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry 1995-
1999, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 449, 458 (2001).
100. See Memorandum from AAI, supra note 93, at 2.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 3.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 15.
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ing, 10 6 which they believe counsels against permitting the merger.' 0 7
There is no discussion of market power, of economics, or of the effect on
consumers.108 The paper's discussion relates to industrial policy and the
use of TARP money. 10 9
The authors go on to argue that these are two really big pharmaceuti-
cal companies and, if they are allowed to merge, Pfizer, in particular, is
going to have fewer incentives to acquire some of these smaller biotech
companies. 1" 0 The paper argues that it is these smaller biotech companies
that really come up with better ideas when it comes to R&D."' The paper
concludes that, if one wants to see innovation in the pharmaceutical indus-
try, the two companies should not be allowed to merge because that will
crowd out the acquisitions that Pfizer otherwise would have made from the
smaller companies. 112
Now, you tell me what the limiting principle is with this concept: the
idea that you stop a merger not because it raises any competitive issue
itself, but because of the hope or expectation that some other undefined
merger would occur at some unknown time down the road?113 Again,
what is this other than industrial policy? It has nothing to do with main-
stream antitrust enforcement. Now, we might ignore this because after all,
this is just a proposal being made to the Federal Trade Commission. But
we have some specific examples at the FTC to talk about as well. 14
U.S. enforcers appear to be moving away from the precision of the
Chicago School (accepting, as we must, that it is not perfect, can get things
wrong, and can be very harsh). But, to my way of thinking, the shift is from
the Chicago School's economically objective analysis to an undefined stan-
dard, which is, to say the least, unhinged and has no limiting parameters.
Where do you draw the line and start or stop this shift?
First I want to talk about the FTC's Ovation Pharmaceutical case. 115
This was a situation with, apparently, very bad facts, and as they say, bad
facts make for bad law. The matter involved a drug called Indocin, which,
among other things, is used to treat congenital heart defects in premature
infants. 1 1 6 Rights to the drug were owned by Merck. 1 17 Ovation, which
previously was not in this market (it was not a pharmaceutical company
106. See id. at 4-5.
107. See id. at 5.
108. See id. at 4, 15.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 8-9.
111. See id. at 7-8.
112. See id. at 8-9.
113. See id.
114. See Jonathan Gleklen, The Emerging Antitrust Philosophy of FTC Commissioner
Rosch, 23 ANTITRUST 46, 46-47 (2009) (discussing Commissioner Rosch's similar
approach in other cases).
115. See generally Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Scrutiny of a Pure Conglomerate Merger:
The Ovation Case, 23 ArTrITRUsT 74 (2009).
116. See id. at 74.
117. See id.
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and had no R&D), bought the rights to Indocin from Merck. 118 There was
no antitrust concern with the purchase because it was not a horizontal
merger; 1 9 it was just a straight transfer of assets to an entity that was not a
competitor. 120 After the sale, however, Ovation approached Abbott Labs,
which had a similar drug in the pipeline-one that was going through the
FDA process and that ultimately would compete with Indocin. 12 1 In other
words, Abbott's drug, NeoProfen, would also likely be indicated for treat-
ment of this congenital heart defect in premature babies. 122 Ovation ulti-
mately acquired Abbott's rights to NeoProfen. 123 The transaction fell
below the mandatory reporting threshold, so there was no obligation to
provide the government pre-merger notification. 12 4
Assuming the accuracy of the allegations in the FTC Complaint, the
company deserves an "A" for stupidity for their next move, which was to
raise the price of the product from $36.00 to $500.00 per vial.' 25 That
amounts to a price increase of 1300%.126 Inasmuch as market power is
defined by the ability to raise prices above a competitive level, and the gov-
ernment considers a 5-10% increase in price as significant evidence of the
fact, it is hardly surprising that the FTC moved aggressively when they
learned of the situation and insisted on unwinding the transaction by
which they obtained NeoProfen. The government had a compelling argu-
ment that the acquisition of the potentially competing product was prob-
lematic because of the increased price flexibility it afforded Ovation.
Challenging the NeoProfen deal was a no-brainer.
The FTC went further, actually, seeking disgorgement of profits in fed-
eral court.12 7 My guess is they are going to get it, assuming disgorgement
is something available to the FTC as a statutory matter-the latter issue
being a subject for another day.
However, two of the commissioners took the position that, not only
was it correct for the FTC to challenge Ovation's acquisition of Neoprofen
from Abbott, but that the FTC should also have gone back and challenged
Ovation's initial acquisition of Indocin from Merck. 128 Now, what was
their argument? After all, that transaction was not between two competi-
118. See Gleklen, supra note 114, at 46.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Leary, supra note 115, at 74.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Complaint at 2, F.T.C. v. Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 8 Civ. 6379 (D.
Minn. 2008).
126. See Jon Leibowitz, Concurring Statement of Commissioner Leibowitz: Federal
Trade Commission v. Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Leibo-
witz Statement], http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810156/081216ovationleibowitzstmt.
pdf.
127. Id. at 11.
128. See id.; Leary, supra note 115, at 74; J. Thomas Rosch, Concurring Statement of
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch: Federal Trade Commission v. Ovation Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Rosch Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/0810156/081216ovationroschstmt.pdf.
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tors, actual or potential. It was a simple change in ownership. There was
no overlap in research and development, and no change in the state of
competition in the market from the day before the transaction to the day
after. 12
9
One of those who would have challenged the Indocin purchase is the
now chairman of the FTC, Jon Leibowitz, 130 one of the more thoughtful
people you will come across. However, the antitrust rationale behind his
reasoning in arguing the FTC should have challenged the Indocin purchase
from Merck eludes me. Chairman Leibowitz first declares profiteering is
immoral and illegal.13 1 I am unaware of legal precedent basing antitrust
merger policy on what's moral or immoral. The Chairman goes on to note
that the transaction serves as a stark reminder of the need for universal
health care. 132
That serves as a very strong statement of public policy, but, first, I do
not see the connection between that observation and the application of
antitrust merger law. To me, these statements are like saying it is warmer
in the summer than it is in the country-a non-sequitur.
One next looks for guidance as to the antitrust foundation for chal-
lenging the initial acquisition in Commissioner Rosch's concurring state-
ment. The Commissioner concludes that when Merck owned these assets,
they did not and would not charge the price the market would bear.133
Merck was charging five dollars, but Ovation raised prices by a huge
amount after purchasing rights to the drug.134 He posits that Merck,
which has a good reputation and sells products across the board, did not
want to take the hit to its image that would result if Merck started exploit-
ing its pricing power on a treatment for premature babies with heart
defects. 135 So, concludes Commissioner Rosch, while in the hands of
Merck, with its broader product portfolio, the product was handled
responsibly. 136
In contrast, opines the Commissioner, Ovation is a single-product
company whose incentives simply are to make as much money as it can on
sales of the product. 137 Thus, both Commissioners challenged the initial
acquisition by a single-product company because it did not have the same
incentives to keep prices down as was the case with Merck, with its reputa-
tional concerns. 138 As a matter of industrial policy or public policy, this
could be considered a fantastic result. But in either statement is there any
reliance on competition laws-the laws these Commissioners are empow-
129. See Complaint, supra note 125, 9 18.
130. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/commissioners/
leibowitz/index.shtml.
131. See Leibowitz Statement, supra note 126, at 1.
132. Id.
133. See Rosch Statement, supra note 128, at 1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Leibowitz Statement, supra note 126, at 1.
138. See id.; Rosch Statement, supra note 128, at 1.
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ered to enforce? Even if a thread to antitrust law could be discerned, what
possible standard could be articulated for making determinations as to
when a single-product company should be able to engage in acquisitions
and when not?
It is often said that we are a nation of entrepreneurs. Must an entity
own a portfolio of products before it is permitted to merge with another
company? Where is the limiting factor? I do not see one. I think these
statements are reflective of pure industrial policy. How could the matter
be resolved relying on the thinking of the Chicago School? For better or for
worse, the Chicago School doesn't take moral positions. 139 Some would
say for worse, but the Chicago School instructs that monopoly profits actu-
ally spur innovation, a conclusion that the Supreme Court echoed as
recently as two days ago.140
The reasoning behind that view is that monopoly profits encourage
others to weigh in with efforts to create an even better solution. 14 1 And
this case actually supports the theory. Abbott had a product in the pipe-
line, and the price of the existing product was low. When did Ovation
raise the price? It was at the point where they got control of both prod-
UCtS. 1 4 2 So the proponents of Chicago School could argue that, prior to
acquisition of the Abbott product, the market was already bringing disci-
pline to the situation.
The theory underpinning Chicago School thought is that the higher
the reward, the more it encourages further innovation. Ovation is a tough
case with which to be defending the Chicago School, because the matter
presents very unattractive facts, and my point here simply is that it isn't
possible to reconcile the statements of Chairman Leibowitz and Commis-
sioner Rosch with any kind of Chicago School analysis. Indeed, the legal
precedent relied upon in the statements is thin, consisting largely of a
dated and obscure Seventh Circuit case. 14 3
The other precedent-and I think, to long-time antitrust practitioners,
this will come as somewhat of a surprise-is the oft-maligned Procter &
Gamble case, perhaps best known as serving to block a conglomerate
merger in 1967 because it was too efficient. 14 4 I noted a footnote in Com-
missioner Rosch's concurrence acknowledging the existence of a view that
139. MARC ALLEN EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS 116 (1991) ("For
most Chicagoans, the use of antitrust to realize grand political, social, and even
macroeconomic objectives was nothing short of perverse.").
140. See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1122
(2009).
141. See, e.g., Gregory K. Price et al., Size and Distribution of Market Benefits from
Adopting Biotech Crops, 1906 U.S.D.A TECH. BULL. 9 (2003) ("Monopoly profits help the
innovator to recover research and development expenditures .... Without these profits,
few incentives to develop these technologies would exist.").
142. See Complaint, supra note 125, 1 22-24.
143. See Rosch Statement, supra note 128, at 2 (citing EKCO Prods. Co. v. F.T.C., 347
F.2d 745, 753, 745 (7th Cir. 1965)).
144. See id. (citing FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967)); Gunnar
Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Introduction: Antitrust in the U.S. and the EU - Converging or
Diverging Paths?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 8 (2004).
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the Procter and Gamble case does not reflect the present state of economic
thinking or the case law.14 5
I think Ovation is Exhibit A for the proposition that bad facts make for
bad law. Even accepting the proposition that straying from a pure eco-
nomic analysis can be justified, how does a regulator determine whether a
company is a "good company" or "bad company," and what standard is
used for making a decision on that basis? Is that the sole parameter to be
used? It is the only factor that seems to have been relied upon in the con-
curring opinions for the conclusion that the FTC should have blocked the
original Indocin acquisition. 14 6
If the Chicago School is being abandoned, this leaves open the ques-
tion of what is replacing it as the mode of analysis. The school of thought
appearing to gain currency at the FTC right now is known as "behavioral
economics."14 7
What are the guiding standards of the behavioralist school? At the
risk of over-simplification, whereas the Chicago School applies rules based
on an assumption of rational behavior, behavioral economists dismiss any
assumption that rational people act rationally. Instead, they would base
decisions on actual observed behavior. Let us look at how people really act
and make our decisions based on that.148
Who could argue with that proposition? It sounds terrific. And if I
could find someone who could predict actual, as opposed to rational
behavior, she would probably be a successful investment advisor, not work-
ing in the bowels of academia or a government bureaucracy. But the fact of
the matter is that people simply do not know how to do that for the most
part. Note also the Chicago School has never stood for the proposition that
it can predict human behavior perfectly. So while there is still clear theo-
retical room for improvement, what justifies a leap to theories like behav-
ioral economics?
One feature of the Chicago School is relative simplicity. 14 9 Propo-
nents will acknowledge they do not always get it right, but it is still better
than any other system. They also believe Chicago School theory explains
human behavior better, in the aggregate, than any theory that attempts to
identify behavioral idiosyncrasy. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc.,15O the majority opinion included a discussion of whether
people who buy photocopiers actually think through what the cost of
145. See FTC. v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 588 n.6 (Harlan, J., concurring).
146. See Rosch Statement, supra note 128, at 2 (citing EKCO Prods. Co. v. F.T.C., 347
F.2d 745, 753, 745 (7th Cir. 1965)).
147. See generally JOSEPH P. MULHOLLAND, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE FTC BEHAviORAL
ECONOMICS CONFERENCE, available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/07
0914mulhollandrpt.pdf.
148. See, e.g., Craig Lambert, The Marketplace of Perceptions, HARv. MAG. 50, 50
(Mar.-Apr. 2006) (discussing the preference for the actual human rather than the "Eco-
nomic Man").
149. See Posner, supra note 7, at 928 (discussing how Aaron Director's antitrust the-
ory was derived from simple price theory).
150. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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repair and of buying a replacement-the so-called "life costs"-and factor
all that in when they pay the initial purchase price. 15 1 Justice Scalia, in
dissent, acknowledged that not all purchasers look at the price of
"aftermarket support," but noted that notwithstanding the "occasional,
irrational consumers[,] . . .we have never before premised the application
of antitrust doctrine on the lowest common denominator of consumer." 15 2
In other words, antitrust law does not protect every consumer, no mat-
ter how lazy, uninformed, or stupid. What it protects is the rational con-
sumer because it is the best available surrogate and it is the only model
that also provides a structured regime with any semblance of predictabil-
ity.' 5 3 I would speculate that behavioral economists point to Chicago
School policy as being a substantial cause of the present economic down-
turn and question its credibility as a normative model, saying, in effect,
"You had your shot, now give us ours."154 And at some level, that observa-
tion is likely to provoke some sympathy.
Let us take an example. Try to think of a market that best approxi-
mates perfect competition-a market where there is instant information,
lots of buyers and sellers, and the ability to enter and exit at will. Let's look
at the stock market, which comes as close to a perfectly competitive market
as you can imagine. Yet, on Tuesday it went down 251 points, and the next
day, with no real difference in the news, it went up 236 points. Do the
behavioralists have a point after all?
I do not have expertise in this area, but from what I have reviewed,
behavioral economists have actually shown quite convincingly that people
do respond to the same stimuli in different ways under different circum-
stances and make different presumptions and different decisions. 15 5 One
example often cited is the employee coffee wagon. Apparently the honor
system works a lot better in a small company than it does in a big company.
The employees in a big company are a lot more likely to cheat the coffee
wagon than those in a small company.
This, and similar examples, cause critics of rational choice theory to
argue: "What reason is there for assuming that people always make deci-
sions based on profit maximization?" 15 6 There are just some good people
out there who make decisions on one basis, and others who reach different
results. Why else, for example, would a rational person visiting a strange
151. Id. at 469-71 .
152. Id. at 495-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified
Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST LJ. 713, 733-34 (1997)
(discussing how consumer protection laws, and not antitrust laws, are designed to pro-
tect against lack of information and other "inside the head" market failures).
154. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051,
1143-44 (2000) (noting that rational choice theories are flawed and that law and eco-
nomics should be transformed into "law and behavioral science").
155. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text for specific examples and more
in-depth discussion.
156. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 154, at 1143.
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town she is never going to see again, leave a tip? Why would a rational
person participate in a blood drive? People needing a transfusion aren't
rejected for never having donated blood. These instances point to what I
see as a difficulty facing proponents of Chicago School: it is based on
tough love and is Darwinian in the way it works, so politically it can be a
very hard doctrine to sell. 157
Behavioral economists have also engaged in more systematic analysis.
For example, they have demonstrated a penchant for loss aversion: people
are much more concerned about a given loss than the positive prospect of
that same gain,' 58 and people tend to be over-optimistic-more willing to
accept good news than bad. Similarly, they have observed an overconfi-
dence bias: people think that good things are going to happen more often
than bad things. 159 Framing the issue can make a difference: if something
is seen as a sure gain as opposed to an avoidance of loss, people will react
differently to the exact same fact pattern. 160
There is much more to be said about behavioral economics, and I sus-
pect we will be hearing more about it over time. However, I will, in the
interest of time, now leave the topic to discuss other instances where I
believe the government has deviated in the antitrust context from pure Chi-
cago School economics. I suppose, given the present ubiquity of the phrase
"too big to fail," that it was only a matter of time before an antitrust regula-
tor sought to find its intersection with competition law. Indeed, at least
one FTC commissioner has suggested a separate blocking screen for merg-
ers that would create entities that are "too big to fail.' 161
The idea behind "too big to fail" is that some companies are entitled to
a government bailout, to stave off failure that would cause a catastrophic
hit on our economy and the nation's financial system. Well, maybe so, but
a lot of companies can become too big to fail under this theory and still
pass a traditional Section 7 antitrust analysis. 162 Some of the banks that
received bailout money are ones that were created as the result of a merger,
157. Alon BravJ.B. Heaton & Alexander Rosenberg, The Rational-Behavioral Debate in
Financial Economics 9 (Duke University, Working Paper, Mar. 3, 2009) (noting that
Milton Friedman's rationality theory resembles Darwin's theory in some respects).
158. See Colin F. Camerer & George Lowenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present
& Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 4 (Camerer et al, eds., 2003).
159. See, e.g., S. Mullainathan & R.H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1094, 1095 (NeilJ. Smelser & Paul
B. Baltes, eds., 2002).
160. See RobertJ. Schiller, Behavioral Economics and Institutional Innovation 4 (Cowles
Found. for Research in Econ. Yale Univ., Discussion Paper No. 1499, 2005) (discussing
the centrality of the concept of framing to behavioral economics).
161. See Speech by J. Thomas Rosch, supra note 84, at 8 (discussing how mergers
should be analyzed with regards to whether they would create entities "too big to fail").
162. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Republican Staff of the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform to Republican Members of the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Full Committee Hearing: "Bank of American and Merrill Lynch:
How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?" - Part II (June 25, 2009) (discuss-
ing the merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch without mention of Section 7
analysis).
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and they passed Section 7 analysis. 163 Indeed, in any particular industry,
there may be more than one player that is too big to fail, which in and of
itself suggests there is not a one-to-one relationship between an entity that
is too big to fail and traditional antitrust analysis. 164
Another FTC Commissioner-generated suggestion for post-Chicago
School merger analysis applies when the two companies in question oper-
ate in two completely different industries. The putative basis for a chal-
lenge would be if substantial leveraging and financing resulted in the
merged entity being too weak to compete effectively with a strong competi-
tor in either of the predecessor industries. 16 5 Again, while the concept
might have superficial appeal, it is far more attuned to an economy with
central planning than one based on competition. How do you analyze
that? I do not know.
It would be one thing if the ideas emanating from the FTC were, for
the moment, mere musings in a speech, but the situation has progressed
beyond that. A recent illustrative case is Fresenius/Daiichi. Fresenius owns
dialysis centers. 16 6 One of the treatments provided at dialysis centers is for
iron deficiency. 167 Fresenius sought to purchase the manufacturer of a
product for the treatment of iron deficiency. 168 This was a purely vertical
merger because a downstream supplier was buying the purchaser of an
input.16 9 Fresenius did not make the drug before the acquisition, and
Daiichi did not own dialysis centers. 170 The owner of iron deficiency dial-
ysis centers, sought to purchase the manufacturer of an upstream prod-
uct.17 1 But the concern, at least as stated by the government in a consent
decree regulating the transaction, did not rely upon typical vertical foreclo-
sure theory.17 2
Traditional vertical foreclosure theory applies if, as the result of acquir-
ing an upstream input, a purchase can effectively deny that input to com-
petitors downstream. The theory of harm derives from the chokehold
created. But no such claim was made here. The argument relied upon by
the FTC was that the acquisition by Fresenius was undertaken to game the
Medicare system. 1 73 Dialysis centers are reimbursed based on average
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Speech byJ. Thomas Rosch, supra note 84, at 5 (providing examples of
several companies in one industry-banking-that were all too big to fail).
165. See id.
166. Federal Trade Commission, Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to
Aid Public Comment 2 (Sep. 15, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810146/0809
15freseniusanal.pdf.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 1.
169. See EISNER, supra note 139, at 130.
170. See FTC, Analysis of Agreement, supra note 166, at 2.
171. See Complaint at 3, In re Fresenius Med. Care AG & Co. KGaA and Daiichi
Sankyo Co., Ltd., No. C-4236 (F.T.C. Sep. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0810146/080915freseniuscmpt.pdf.
172. See FTC, Analysis of Agreement, supra note 166, at 3-4.
173. See Fresenius Complaint, supra note 171, at 4.
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sales price. 174 And so, according to the FTC, if Fresenius purchases the
rights to an iron drug, it will then raise the internal transfer price to its own
dialysis centers, which in turn, will raise the national average sales price,
with the result being that not only Fresenius, but competing dialysis cen-
ters as well, are going to get higher rates of reimbursement for Medicare. 175
As with some of the other examples I have spoken about, the FTC
action may lead to a terrific public policy result, but what does it have to
do with application of competition law? The FTC's theory appears even
more anomalous when the FTC's solution is examined. The FTC imposed
rate caps for the period of time in which the merged entity could conceiva-
bly engage in regulatory evasion.1 76 Again, it may be hard to criticize the
result from a public policy standpoint, but, one has to ask, where is the
antitrust analysis?
Lest you think deviations from well-settled antitrust doctrine are just
occurring at the FTC, there are signs of its looming presence in the courts
as well. A transaction you may have heard of recently involved two stores
that sell premium, natural, organic foods: Whole Foods and Wild Oats. 17 7
The FTC concluded that if these two players were to merge, competi-
tion would be eliminated in the market for premium, natural, organic
stores. 178 More specifically, in eighteen locations, the merger would elimi-
nate the only organic stores. 17 9 So, the FTC moved to block the transac-
tion.' 80 The District Court properly asked the conventional question in
this situation: if prices are increased at all organic stores by a certain
amount-five percent-will consumers accept the price increase or would
the increase be unprofitable because sufficient numbers would shift their
purchases to a conventional store?18 1
If a sufficient number of consumers would switch so as to render the
price increase unprofitable, one could conclude the relevant product mar-
ket extends beyond organic stores to also encompass conventional super-
markets. 18 2 The District Court observed that when Whole Foods
determined its prices, it was done across an entire region. In other words,
Whole Foods did not historically set its prices at a different level in those
areas with a Wild Oats store.183 Moreover, Whole Foods, when conducting
its pricing research, compared itself with conventional supermarkets and
others. 18 4 The District Court concluded on this evidence that the FTC
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See FTC, Analysis of Agreement, supra note 166, at 3-4.
177. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt. Inc. [Whole Foods 1], 502 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.C. 2007),
rev'd, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
178. See Complaint at 1, Whole Foods 1, 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1:07-cv-01021), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710114/070605complaint.pdf.
179. See Whole Foods 1, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 34.
183. See id. at 39.
184. See id. at 29.
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could not meet its burden that Whole Foods/Wild Oats would profitably
be able to raise prices post merger.18 5 Therefore, the preliminary injunc-
tion was denied.1 8 6
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals began its discussion with
the gratuitous observation that the District Court did a fabulous job in its
reasoning' 87 and that the FTC did a really lousy job-a statement that was
both gratuitous, and in my view, incorrect.' 88 But the D.C. Circuit then
proceeded to reverse the District Court because it reached the wrong con-
clusion' 8 9 by erroneously focusing on the so-called marginal consumer.190
The marginal consumer is the one who is the most sensitive to a price
change. 19 1 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that all consumers are protected by
the antitrust laws, not just the marginal consumer. 19 2 And the D.C. Circuit
is absolutely right about that. But the D.C. Circuit missed the point of
focusing on the marginal consumer. The fact is that traditional antitrust
analysis does look at the marginal consumer to ascertain whether enough
of them will defect in response to a price hike to make that action unprofit-
able. The exercise of looking at the marginal consumer is undertaken for
the very reason that it identifies those situations where a merger can
adversely affect all consumers. If the price hike would be unprofitable, the
merged entity will not impose it. 193 And when the merged entity keeps
prices at the status quo, both the core customers and the marginal custom-
ers are protected.
On the other hand, if the marginal customers are not going to switch
away, then the price increase is profitable, the merger would be prohibited
as violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and all consumers would be pro-
tected. 19 4 So the District Court, I would submit to you, was completely
right.
Also notably, the D.C. Circuit relied for its reasoning on a 1965
Supreme Court case, Brown Shoe, which stands for the dubious proposition
that rigorous analytical market study is not required to establish market
definition. 195 Instead it is sufficient to pose a series of qualitative ques-
tions: How is the industry perceived?19 6 How does the public look at the
industry? Are the products viewed as unique? The idea is that if you throw
all these observations together and really think they suggest products are
in the same or separate markets, that's enough. 197 It may be a little over-
185. See id. at 35.
186. See id. at 50.
187. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. [Whole Foods II], 548 F.3d 1028, 1032 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Whole Foods 1, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
192. See Whole Foods II, 548 F.3d at 1037.
193. See Whole Foods 1, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
194. See id. at 19, 22.
195. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
196. See id.
197. See id.
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stated to call Brown Shoe the worst antitrust decision ever written, but it
certainly ranks high on the list and out-ranks several other worthy
candidates. 198
Regardless of its merits, or lack thereof, Brown Shoe simply is not a
case that recently, prior to the D.C. Circuit decision, was thought to be
instructive on the issue of market definition in this day and age. 19 9 Reli-
ance on the case generally meant some allowance to raise qualitative fac-
tors, but only in conjunction with a quantitative assessment of market
definition and product substitutability. To my mind, the D.C. Circuit
almost entirely disregarded the steady and careful development over the
last twenty-five years of the application of economic principles to the ques-
tion of market definition, falling back instead on an undisciplined, qualita-
tive form of analysis, and making the majority opinion a relic of a bygone
era when antitrust laws were divorced from basic economic principles. 20 0
In my view, the dissenting opinion was correct. I think the more inter-
esting-and valid-question is whether the decision of the D.C. Circuit is
simply a relic of the past or a precursor of things to come. At the very least,
it serves as a wake-up call for those who have been confidently claiming
victory for the Chicago School when it comes to the proper methodology
for antitrust for merger review.
Thank you very much for being here and for allowing me the honor of
speaking at this symposium.
198. See Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox 8 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Work-
ing Paper No. 317, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=828784#.
199. See Born, supra note 37, at 210.
200. See Whole Foods II, 548 F.3d 1028, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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